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Abstract 
Between 3 and 5 years of age children develop the ability to plan for their own 
and others’ future needs; however, they have great difficulty predicting future needs that 
conflict with current ones. Importantly, this ability has only been tested in the domain of 
physiological states (e.g., thirst). Therefore, it is still an open question whether in a 
different context preschoolers can disengage from their current needs to secure a different 
future one. In a Resource Allocation task, 4- and 5-year-olds had to distribute three types 
of rewards between themselves and another child for either “right now” or “tomorrow.” 
Children’s current needs were manipulated by providing them (or not) with their 
preferred reward at beginning of the task. Only 5-year-olds could predict future needs 
that conflict with their current ones and act accordingly. Younger children’s performance 
is discussed in the context of temporal and social distance. 
Keywords: Bischof-Köhler account, future needs, prosociality, preschoolers 
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“Will I Want These Stickers Tomorrow?” 
Preschoolers’ Ability to Predict Current and Future Needs 
Successfully anticipating our own needs allows us to make effective decisions 
about our future (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). For example, predicting that I will 
be sick if I eat my whole birthday cake now allows me to save most of it for later. 
Correctly anticipating others’ needs also has crucial implications for our future since it 
allows us to function effectively as social individuals (e.g., Berndt, 2002). It is by 
understanding what others might need that we can make prosocial decisions. For 
example, I know that my friend is hungry now, so I should share my birthday cake with 
her. 
Between ages 3 and 5 there is an important increase in children’s abilities to 
anticipate their own future needs (e.g., Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Atance, Louw, & 
Clayton, 2015; McCormack & Hanley, 2011; Payne, Taylor, Hayne, & Scarf, 2015; 
Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011). However, evidence for differences in 
performance among these age groups are mixed. For example, Suddendorf et al. (2011) 
showed that whereas 4-year-old children could successfully select a correct tool (e.g., a 
key) to solve a future problem (e.g., unlock a box to obtain a reward), 3-year-olds failed 
to do so. By comparison, using a similar paradigm, Payne et al. (2015) found that 3-year-
olds were as likely as 4-year-olds to select a correct item. Children also start anticipating 
others’ future needs between ages 3 to 5. For example, Russell, Alexis, and Clayton 
(2010) taught 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds to play a “blow football” game in which the child 
and the experimenter stood on either side of a table. To play the game from the 
experimenter’s side, however, children needed a box to stand on in addition to the straw 
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to blow the ball. At the end of the game, children were told that another child would be 
returning “tomorrow” and that the child would play from the experimenter’s side. Only 4- 
and 5-year-olds selected the two items that the other child would need for “tomorrow.” 
Again, Payne et al. (2015) found that 3-year-olds succeeded in a similar task. Using a 
very different experimental paradigm, Bélanger, Atance, Varghese, Nguyen, and Vendetti 
(2014) assessed preschoolers’ ability to appreciate changes in others’ future or “grown-
up” preferences. Their results showed that by the age of 4 children could predict someone 
else’s preferences in the future.  
While the above studies investigated when children begin to think about their own 
and others’ future needs, they do not necessarily address when children begin to think 
about future needs that are different from their current ones—the so-called “Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis” in the animal literature (Bischof-Köhler, 1985; Bischof-Köhler & 
Bischof, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). This is 
because in the above studies children were asked to make decisions for a future need that 
was apparently similar to the present one (Atance, 2015; Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013). 
Thus, it is possible that selecting a correct item (e.g., key) may only indicate that children 
knew that the item was useful now without having to represent its use in a future event 
(McCormack & Hoerl, 2011; Hudson, Mayhew & Prabhakar, 2011).  
The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis was established as a criterion for future thinking 
in non-human animals (Bischof-Köhler, 1985) and states that “... animals other than 
humans cannot anticipate future needs and drive states and are therefore bound to a 
present that is defined by their current motivational state” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 
p. 150). Recent findings refute the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis in non-human animals 
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(e.g., Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Raby, Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007). 
In contrast, children as old as 7 years of age find it difficult to predict what they will need 
in the future when their future need (e.g., hunger) differs from their current one (e.g., 
thirst) (Atance & Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014; Mahy, 2016). 
For example, in Atance and Meltzoff’s (2006) “Pretzel task”, children were asked to eat 
pretzels while the experimenter read them a story. Crucially, eating pretzels made 
children thirsty. After reading the story, children were asked if they would want to have 
water or pretzels “right now” or “tomorrow.”  Children predicted that they would want 
water “right now” but also “tomorrow.” In contrast, children who did not eat pretzels and, 
therefore, were not thirsty, predicted that they would want pretzels for “right now” and 
“tomorrow.” Atance and Meltzoff (2006) argued that children’s state of thirst “right now” 
was so salient that it made it difficult for them to step out of their current state to 
appreciate that they will no longer be thirsty (and thus desire pretzels) “tomorrow.”	 
To date, children’s abilities to predict future needs that conflict with current ones 
have only been tested in the context of children’s predictions of hunger or thirst. 
However, the concept of “need” is not necessarily limited to physiological states, it can 
also refer to the “lack of something requisite, desirable or useful” (see Merriam-Webster 
dictionary). For example, adult humans can anticipate that once they retire, they will need 
to have savings. As such, they start saving for retirement even when their current need for 
money is satisfied. Moreover, previous work has shown that preschoolers have a poor 
understanding of how physiological states (e.g., hunger) relate to the development of 
desires (Moses, Coon, & Wusinich, 2000). Moses et al. (2000) told 4- and 5-year-olds a 
story with two characters: one who had eaten/drunk a large amount of food/water a long 
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time ago and another one who had done so a short time ago. Both age groups failed to 
predict that only the character who had had food/water a long time ago would want to 
eat/drink. Moses et al. (2000) argued that reasoning about physiological needs might be 
particularly difficult because they generate an incongruent immediate desire. For 
example, eating pretzels generates a physiological state of satiation and, therefore, a 
desire to not eat more. In light of these findings, preschoolers’ poor performance at 
predicting future needs that conflict with current ones may be explained by a failure to 
understand how physiological states change over time rather than by an inability to think 
about future needs that they are not currently experiencing (i.e., Bischof-Köhler account). 
The Current Study 
The goal of the current study was to assess preschoolers’ ability to predict future 
needs that differ from their current ones in a context that did not directly involve 
physiological states. In particular, children were asked to distribute rewards in a Resource 
Allocation task (e.g., Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008) for themselves and for 
another child for either “right now” or “tomorrow” (e.g., Atance & Metzolf, 2006). 
Children’s current needs were manipulated by providing them (or not) with their 
preferred reward at the beginning of the experiment—“Extra-reward” condition and “No 
extra-reward” condition, respectively. Thus, the Resource Allocation task allowed 
assessing whether participants’ prosocial behavior (e.g., forgoing their preferred reward 
in order to provide another child with it) was influenced (1) by participants owning (or 
not) their preferred reward, and (2) by when they would have access to the rewards—
“right now” or “tomorrow.”  
Sharing provides a compelling situation to test preschoolers’ ability to predict 
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future needs that differ from their current ones. First of all, deciding to share involves 
children considering their own and someone else’s needs as well as considering how 
someone else’s needs might conflict with their own needs (e.g., if my friend does not 
have chocolates, I could share mine with her). Research using a delay of gratification task 
has shown that by the age of 3 children can make decisions that benefit someone else 
(Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005); however, it is not until the age of 4 that children start to make 
prosocial decisions that will benefit others in the future—even when sharing is costly for 
the child (e.g., Fehr et al., 2008; Moore, 2009; Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998; 
Paulus & Moore, 2014; Thompson, Barresi & Moore, 1997). Secondly, deciding to share 
also involves children assessing how their current needs change over time and how these 
needs might conflict with future ones. Consequently, understanding how current and 
future needs conflict with each other will also be reflected on prosocial responses. If my 
friend does not have chocolates but I will want chocolates again tomorrow, I will 
probably not share my extra-bag of chocolates with her.  
Since children’s performance in future thinking tasks (e.g., Atance et al., 2015; 
McCormack & Hanley, 2011) as well as in resource allocation tasks (e.g., Lemmon & 
Moore, 2007; Thompson et al., 1997) improves between ages 4 to 5, these two age 
groups were included in the current study. If, as suggested above, children’s difficulty in 
predicting future needs that conflict with current ones is due to their difficulties in 
understanding how physiological states change across time (e.g., Moses et al., 2000), then 
children would succeed in the current task—although older children would perform better 
than younger children (see Table 1 for predictions). This is because the current task 
involves making predictions about needs and not about physiological states. In contrast, 
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if as previous research has shown, children’s ability to predict future needs that conflict 
with current ones is a late-emerging cognitive skill (e.g., Mahy, 2016), neither age nor 
resource distribution would affect children’s performance.  
Additionally, children were also assessed on their ability to allocate their 
preferred reward into another child’s box when participants’ needs did not conflict with 
others’ needs. This task—the Knowledge task—took place before the Resource 
Allocation task and it entailed children allocating one of the three rewards into another 
child’s box. It was predicted that 4- and 5-year-old children would succeed at allocating 
their preferred reward in the other child’s box for “right now” and “tomorrow.”  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 98 typically developing children (46 females; 52 males) aged 4 
(M=55 months, Range= 47 to 58, n=50) and 5 (M=64 months, Range= 60 to 70, n=48). 
Participants were fluent in English and from working- and middle-class populations. 
Children were tested individually in a quiet room at three different schools in XXX, in 
the child lab facilities at the XXX or at a science museum (XXX) in XXX. The 
experiment received ethical approval from the XXX Ethics Committee. Parents provided 
written informed consent for their children’s participation, and children also provided 
their verbal assent. 
Materials and procedure 
The apparatus consisted of two cardboard boxes (13x12x7cm). One box had a 
picture depicting chocolates on its lid and the other box had a picture of stickers on its lid. 
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Five small transparent plastic bags—two containing 6 stickers each, two with 6 
chocolates each and one bag with 6 distractor objects (i.e., 1.5 cm length x 0.8 cm width 
pieces of black fabric in the shape of teardrops)—were used as items to be allocated 
inside the boxes (i.e., one bag with chocolates, one bag with stickers, and one bag with 
distractors) and as rewards for the children (i.e., one bag with chocolates, and one bag 
with stickers).  
An experimental session consisted of three main events: (1) Reward preference 
test, (2) Knowledge task, and (3) Resource Allocation task.  
(1) Reward preference test. The Experimenter (E) first established children’s 
preference for the rewards by showing them one bag with 6 chocolates and one with 6 
stickers, and asking them “What do you prefer: chocolates or stickers?” Children could 
answer verbally or point to the bag with their preferred reward. Fifty percent of the 
children showed a preference for chocolates and the remaining 50% for the stickers. 
Importantly, children’s performance in the current study was not related to their preferred 
reward (Knowledge task: c2= 2.23, df=1, p=.13; Resource Allocation task: c2= .41, df=1, 
p=.52). Next, children were randomly distributed to either the No extra-reward condition 
or to the Extra-reward condition. Whereas in the former E did not provide children with 
their preferred reward, in the latter E provided them with their preferred reward and told 
them that it belonged to them. Children were asked to not use/consume them, at least, 
until the task/game was over. This was done in order to avoid manipulating children’s 
current states— for instance, by eating chocolates—before allocating the rewards.   
(2) Knowledge task. E showed the child a box with a picture on the lid always 
depicting the child’s favorite reward (e.g., if the child preferred stickers, the lid had a 
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picture with stickers). Then, E asked the child “Would you like to open it?”. Once the 
child found out that the box was empty, E showed him/her one bag with stickers, one 
with chocolates and one with the distractors. Children were then randomly assigned to the 
“right now” or “tomorrow” condition and E said “Imagine that another little girl/boy the 
same age as you is going to open this box right now/tomorrow, ok? What would you like 
to put inside her/his box?” In the “tomorrow” condition, E explained the concept of 
“tomorrow” by showing the child a timeline with a picture of a little child going to bed 
and waking up in the morning. Then E said “everything that happens when s/he wakes up 
in the morning is tomorrow.”  The Knowledge task assessed children’s ability to allocate 
their preferred reward into another child’s box when participants’ current needs did not 
conflict with others’ needs. 
(3) Resource Allocation task.   The combination of the “Extra-reward” and “No-extra 
reward” conditions together with the “right now” or “tomorrow” conditions yielded 4 
experimental conditions. Children were randomly assigned to one of them. Importantly, 
the temporal marker was kept constant across the Knowledge and the Resource 
Allocation tasks. That is, if in the Knowledge task children had to allocate rewards for 
“right now”, the same was done in the Resource Allocation task.  
(a) Extra-reward – access to rewards right now:  E left the box with the 
picture on the lid depicting the child’s preferred reward (e.g., stickers) on the table and 
put away the three bags with the rewards. Then, E showed the child a second box with a 
picture on the lid always depicting the child’s less preferred reward (e.g., chocolates) and 
said “Imagine that you and the other child are going to play with these two boxes right 
now: you are going to get to play with this box (e.g., chocolate box) and s/he is going to 
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get to play with this other box (e.g., sticker box). And everything you put in your box you 
get to have right now and everything you put in his/her box, s/he gets to have right now!” 
Next, E showed the child the bags with stickers, chocolates, and the distractors and asked 
two questions: (1) “self” question: “which one of these things would you like to put in 
your box?” and (2) “other” question: “which one of these things would you like to put in 
his/her box?” Children could only allocate one bag to each of the two boxes and the 
contents of the bags could not be split. To ensure that children knew which box was 
his/hers and which one was the other child’s box, E asked the child to put the chosen bags 
inside the boxes. All children succeeded at identifying his/her box and the other child’s 
box. The order in which the “self” and “other” questions were asked was counterbalanced 
across participants. Importantly, the order of these questions did not affect children’s 
choices for the other child (c2= 0.001, df=1, p=0.980) or for themselves (c2= 0.168, df=1, 
p=0.682) for either the “right now” or “tomorrow” conditions. 
(b) Extra-reward – access to rewards tomorrow: The same procedure as the 
“Extra-reward — access to rewards right now” condition was used, but “right now” was 
replaced with “tomorrow” when E told children to imagine “that you and the other child 
are going to play with these two boxes tomorrow […]. And everything you put in your 
box you get to have tomorrow and everything you put in his/her box, s/he gets to have 
tomorrow!” The concept of “tomorrow” was again explained to children. 
(c) No extra-reward – access to rewards right now: The same procedure as 
for the “Extra-reward — access to rewards right now” condition was used. The only 
difference was that E did not provide children with their preferred reward after she 
established their reward preference. 
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(d) No extra-reward – access to rewards tomorrow: The same procedure as 
for the “Extra-reward — access to rewards tomorrow” condition was used. The only 
difference was that E did not provide children with their preferred reward after she 
established their reward preference. 
 
Scoring and analyses 
Children’s ability to correctly allocate their preferred reward (i.e., reward matching the 
picture on the other child’s box) in the Knowledge task (chosen item matches the object 
depicted on the box=1, chosen item does not match the object depicted on the box=0) 
was scored as well as children’s resource allocation for themselves—“self” question- and 
the other child –“other” question- (chosen item matches the object depicted on the box=1, 
chosen item does not match the object depicted on the box=0) in the Resource Allocation 
task. See Table 2 for the percentage of children choosing one of the three possible 
rewards.  
Pearson chi-square and a three-way cross-tabulation were used to analyze 
children’s resource distribution pattern questions in the “Extra-reward” and “No extra-
reward” conditions. Binomial tests were also conducted to assess whether children were 
above chance in the “right now” and “tomorrow” conditions (chance=33%) for the “Self” 
and “Other” questions. Finally, ϕ was used to report effect size for significant effects. 
Statistical tests were two-tailed, and results were considered significant if p<.05. 
 
Results 
Resource Allocation task 
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“Other” questions  
Choices for “right now.” Age affected children’s resource allocation patterns for 
“right now” (c2= 7.76, df=1, p=.005; ϕ =.420). In particular, more 5-year-olds than 4-
year-olds allocated their preferred reward to the other child’s box in the “Extra-reward” 
condition (c2= 5.57, df=1, p=.018; ϕ =.463) but not in the “No extra-reward” condition 
(c2= 1.94, df=1, p=.163). Further analyses showed that 5-year-olds put their preferred 
reward in the other’s child box significantly above chance in the “Extra-reward” 
condition (71%, binomial test: p=.004) but not in the “No extra-reward” condition (38%, 
binomial test: p=.524). In contrast, 4-year-olds put their less preferred reward in the 
other’s child box significantly above chance in both the “Extra-reward” condition (75%, 
binomial test: p=.004) and “No extra-reward” condition (90%, binomial test: p<.001; see 
Figure 1). That is, only older children allocated their preferred reward to the other child’s 
box when their current needs did not conflict with what another child would expect to 
find inside the box “right now.” 
Choices for “tomorrow.” Age also had an effect on how children distributed the 
rewards for “tomorrow” (c2= 6.19, df=1, p=.013; ϕ =.342).  More 5-year-olds compared 
to 4-year-olds allocated their less preferred reward to the other child’s box in the “No 
extra-reward” condition (c2= 4.02, df=1, p=.045; ϕ =.428) but not in the “Extra-reward” 
condition (c2= 2.36, df=1, p=.124). Further analyses revealed that 5-year-olds put their 
less preferred item significantly above chance in the other child’s box in both “Extra-
reward” and “No extra-reward” conditions (87% and 90% respectively, binomial test: 
p<.001 in both cases). In contrast, 4-year-olds put their preferred reward in the other 
child’s box significantly above chance in the “Extra-reward” condition (63%, binomial 
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test: p=.015) but not in the “No extra-reward” condition (50%, binomial test: p=.171; see 
Figure 1). That is, irrespective of whether children’s current needs did or did not conflict 
with what another child would anticipate to find inside the box “tomorrow”, older 
children allocated their less preferred reward to the other child’s box; in contrast, younger 
children tended to allocate their preferred reward to the other child’s box. 
“Self” questions  
Choices for “right now.” Age did not have a significant effect on children’s 
performance (c2= 3.30, df=1, p=.069). However, more children put their preferred reward 
(i.e., reward matching the other child’s box) in their own box in the “No extra-reward” 
condition compared to the “Extra-reward” condition (c2= 5.52, df=1, p=.019; ϕ =.354). 
Further analyses revealed that children put their preferred reward in their box 
significantly above chance in the “No extra-reward” condition (66%, binomial test: 
p=.004) but not in the “Extra-reward” condition (32%; binomial test: p=.496; Figure 2). 
That is, when children’s current needs conflicted with what another child would expect to 
find inside the box “right now”, both younger and older children put their preferred 
reward in their own box. 
Choices for “tomorrow.” Age had an effect on how children allocated the 
rewards to their own box for “tomorrow” (c2= 5.27, df=1, p=.022; ϕ =.313). More 5-year-
olds than 4-year-olds allocated their preferred reward to their own box—although only in 
the “No extra-reward” condition (c2= 3.88, df=1, p=.049; ϕ =.411). Five-year-olds put 
their preferred reward in their box significantly above chance in both the “Extra-reward” 
(73%, binomial test: p=.019) and the “No extra-reward” conditions (81%, binomial test: 
p=.001). In contrast, 4-year-olds did not put their preferred reward in their box own 
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significantly above chance in either condition—41% did so in the “Extra-reward” 
condition and 41% in the “No extra-reward” condition (Figure 2).  
Knowledge task 
Neither being provided (or not) with the reward at the beginning of the task (c2= 
1.087, df=1, p=.297) nor age (c2= .857, df=1, p=.355) affected children’s responses. 
Younger (71%) and older children (65%) allocated their preferred reward significantly 
above chance into the other child’s box (binomial test: p<.05 in both cases). In other 
words, regardless of whether children had (or not) their preferred reward, they were 
successful at allocating the reward matching the picture on lid of the box.  
 
Discussion 
The results indicated that only older children’s ability to distribute resources for 
“right now” and “tomorrow” was determined by their current and future needs. In the 
“Extra-reward” condition, 5-year-olds allocated their preferred reward into another 
child’s box only for “right now” but not for “tomorrow”—consistent with the Bischof- 
Köhler account. Moreover, in the “No extra-reward” condition 5-year-olds allocated their 
preferred reward into their own box for “right now” and “tomorrow.” In contrast, 4-year-
olds’ performance was mostly affected by when they had access to their preferred reward. 
They tended to allocate their preferred reward into their box for “right now” but into the 
other child’s box for “tomorrow.”  Note that when participants provided the other child 
with their less preferred reward, they tended to equally allocate their less preferred 
reward (either chocolates or stickers—depending on the participants’ reward preferences) 
and the distractor objects. However, when the participants allocated their less prefer 
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reward to themselves, they mostly allocated chocolates or stickers—depending on their 
reward preferences. Crucially, both 4- and 5-year-olds provided the other child with their 
preferred reward when their own needs did not conflict with the other child’s needs—as 
the findings from the Knowledge task indicated. Finally, providing the children with the 
reward at the start of the task only affected their performance in the Resource Allocation 
task—suggesting that it is only when there is a conflict between their current needs and 
another child’s expectations that they distribute resources differently. 
Consistent with the predictions, 5-year-olds’ performance indicates that they were 
able to take into account their current and future needs when distributing resources for 
themselves and another child for “right now” and “tomorrow.” This is because in the 
“Extra-reward” condition (i.e., current need is satisfied) older children allocated their 
preferred reward into another child’s box when they could access the rewards “right 
now.” In contrast, they allocated their preferred reward into their own box when they 
could access the rewards “tomorrow.” This suggests that 5-year-olds could anticipate that 
even if their current needs were satisfied, they would want to have their preferred reward 
again “tomorrow.” In contrast, when their current need for the reward was not satisfied 
(i.e., “No extra-reward” condition), they allocated their preferred reward into their own 
box for “right now” and “tomorrow.”  Thus, in contrast to previous findings (Atance & 
Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy et al., 2014; Mahy, 2016), the present study suggests that 5-year-
olds can anticipate non-physiological future needs that differ from their current ones. 
Because children in the current study were not asked to use/consume the rewards 
immediately after being provided with them, one could argue that their current needs 
were not actively manipulated. Two important points can be made here. First, even if 
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children did not have to predict a future physiological state that was different from their 
current one (e.g., thirsty now vs. hungry tomorrow), they still have to predict a future 
need that was different from the current one (e.g., owning a bag with chocolates now vs. 
not owning a bag with chocolates tomorrow). Second, it is precisely older children’s 
difference performance between the “Extra-reward” and the “No extra-reward” 
conditions that supports the conclusion that they are able to predict future needs that are 
different from the current ones. Otherwise, they should have behaved identically in both 
conditions. 
In contrast to older children, younger children failed to take into account their 
current and future needs when distributing resources for “right now” and “tomorrow” for 
both the “self” and the “other.” Four-year-olds kept their favorite reward for "right now" 
(60%, binomial test: p=.011) but they tended to allocate it into another child's box for 
"tomorrow" (68%, binomial test: p=.001). The results from the Knowledge task show that 
younger children allocated their preferred reward into the other child’s box when their 
needs were not in conflict with each other. Moreover, their choices in this task did not 
differ between “right now” and “tomorrow” (c2= 0.298, df=1, p=0.585).  This suggests 
that 4-year-olds knew which reward to put in another’s child box regardless of when the 
other child had access to the reward. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that younger 
children’s performance in the Resource Allocation task is due to a lack of understanding 
of what is expected to be found inside the box. Additionally, previous research on future 
thinking has shown that by the age of 4 children can anticipate their own and others’ 
future needs (e.g., Russell et al., 2010; Suddendorf et al., 2011). 
Why did 4-year-olds allocate their less preferred rewards into another child’s box 
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for “right now” and their preferred reward for “tomorrow”—irrespective of whether there 
was or was not a cost to them? It is possible that younger children struggled to inhibit 
choosing their preferred reward because they could obtain it “right now” (e.g., Mischel & 
Metzner, 1962; Moore et al., 1998). This is because although they had already been 
provided with their preferred reward (i.e., current need was satisfied), they were not 
necessarily satiated. Alternatively, younger children may have a preference for less 
egalitarian distributions than 5-year-olds (Fehr et al., 2008). However, this does not 
explain why younger children tended to make more prosocial decisions when the rewards 
could be accessed “tomorrow.” It is also possible that younger children’s difficulty in the 
present task was due to their failure to understand the concept of “tomorrow”—even 
though all children were presented with a timeline in which “tomorrow” was physically 
represented and conceptually explained to them. However, if 4-year-olds had difficulties 
to understand what “tomorrow” entailed, they would have also had difficulties to allocate 
the rewards in the Knowledge task. Crucially, no differences were found between the 
“right now” and “tomorrow” conditions for the Knowledge task. 
It may also be possible that 4-year-olds failed at distributing resources because 
there is a conflict between what they themselves prefer and what another child expects to 
find inside the box. However, previous studies have reported that by age 4 children 
already engage in prosocial behaviors (i.e., altruistic sharing) in Resource Allocation 
experimental paradigms (e.g., House, Henrich, Brosnan, & Silk, 2012; Fehr et al., 2008; 
Moore, 2009; Moore et al., 1998; Thompson et al., 1997). Importantly, research has also 
shown that children’s sharing behavior can be affected by different factors—including 
the amount of resources available (e.g., Hay, Caplan, Castle, & Stimson, 1991), the 
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history of previous collaboration (e.g., Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) or, 
among others, the type of relationship with the other child (e.g., Fehr et al., 2008). 
In this regard, the Resource Allocation task used here introduced two new factors 
that could affect how children distribute resources. The first factor is the type of reward 
to be distributed. In the present study children had to allocate rewards that were 
qualitatively different—as opposed to allocating certain amounts of the same reward 
between themselves and another child (e.g., House et al., 2012, for a review). The second 
factor is the temporal distance between children’s choices and when they could access 
the rewards—either “right now” or “tomorrow.”  Despite recent findings (Redshaw & 
Suddendorf, 2013) showing that 4-year-olds seem to rely on the same mechanisms when 
selecting an item that they can use in a near (e.g., 5 min) and in a more distant future 
(e.g., 15 min), research on temporal discounting—using paradigms similar to the one 
used here—shows that preschool children are sensitive to the length of delay before they 
can obtain the rewards (e.g., Lemon & Moore, 2007; Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Schwarz, 
Schrager, & Lyons, 1983). For example, Schwarz et al. (1983) found that 3 to 6 year olds 
chose to delay a reward more often when they could obtain it at the end of day rather than 
the next day. Moreover, a more recent study reported an association between the 
development of temporal distance and social distance (Garon, Johnson, & Steeves, 2011). 
In particular, the results showed that by the age of 4 children who favored a future self 
that is close in time also displayed prosocial behaviors (e.g., share) to socially close 
children (e.g., friends; Garon et al., 2011). In contrast, the ability to share with strangers 
has been shown to develop later in ontogeny and there seems to be an increase between 
ages 5 to 7 (Fehr et al., 2008).  
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Thus, it is conceivable that both social distance and temporal distance could 
explain younger children’s behavior in the present study. Children might have decided to 
keep their favorite reward for “right now” because even if gender and age between the 
participants and the other child was matched, the latter was a “stranger” to them. It 
follows that younger children might have discounted the value of the future reward and, 
consequently, decided to give it to the other child “tomorrow.” That is, once the value of 
their preferred reward reaches the same level as the other two rewards, “sharing” 
becomes less costly to them. Taken together, these findings suggest that 4-year-olds 
might have considered the temporal distance and the social distance, but failed to 
incorporate their own current and future needs into their decision-making process.  
The current study provides new insights into children’s future thinking abilities 
and shows that 5-year-old children take into account their current and (different) future 
needs when deciding how to allocate resources between themselves and another child. In 
contrast, 4-year-old children failed to do so. Two factors—temporal distance and social 
distance— are suggested to be at play in younger children’s performance. One way to 
address this possibility is by presenting preschoolers with a task in which in addition to 
manipulating their current needs, the social distance between participants and the other is 
also manipulated. This would help to disentangle whether the role of the “other” in this 
type of task overrides children’s abilities to take into account how their present and future 
needs change over time. Another line of research would be to address children’s 
performance when their current needs and someone else’s current needs are being 
manipulated. This would help to shed light on the kinds of contexts that are particularly 
challenging to young children’s future-oriented decision-making, both for themselves and 
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for someone else. Finally, the implications of the present study are crucial for 
understanding the development of future thinking skills. At the theoretical level, the 
ability to think about future needs that conflict with current ones seems to emerge earlier 
than previously thought (e.g., Atance & Meltzoff, 2006). At the methodological level, the 
present study highlights the importance of investigating children’s future-oriented skills 
in different contexts. 
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Table 1. Predicted resource distribution for the “other” and “self” according to the 
Bischof-Köhler account   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bischof-Köhler account “other” questions “self” questions
right now
no extra-reward
5-year-olds and 4-year-olds would allocate their less
preferred reward (i.e., does not match the reward depicted 
on the other child’s box) to the other child’s box. This is 
because their current need is not satisfied.
5-year-olds and 4-year-olds would allocate their 
preferred reward (i.e., does not match the reward 
depicted on their own box) to their own box.
extra-reward
5-year-olds > 4-year-olds would allocate their favorite reward 
(i.e., matches the reward depicted on the other child’s box) to 
the other child’s box. This is because their current need is 
satisfied.
5-year-olds > 4-year-olds would allocate their less 
preferred reward (i.e., matches the reward depicted 
on their own box) to their own box.
tomorrow
no extra-reward
5-year-olds and 4-year-olds would allocate their less
preferred reward to the other child’s box This is because their 
future need may not be satisfied.
5-year-olds and 4-year-olds would allocate their 
preferred reward to their own box.
extra-reward
5-year-olds > 4-year-olds would allocate their less preferred 
reward to the other child’s box. This is because even if their 
current need is satisfied, children have to anticipate that their 
future one may not be satisfied. 
5-year-olds > 4-year-olds would allocate their 
preferred reward to their own box.
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Table 2. Percentage of children choosing each of the three rewards for the other child 
(“Other” questions) or for themselves (“Self” questions) grouped by age group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age Conditions Bag with stickers
Bag with 
chocolates
Bag with
distractors
4YO
“Other” 
questions 54 23 23
“Self” questions 35 63 2
5YO
“Other” 
questions 40 36 24
“Self” questions 48 48 4
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Figure 1. Percentage of 4- and 5-year-old children who allocated their preferred 
reward into the other child’s box for “right now” and “tomorrow” in the Resource 
Allocation task. (a) represents the condition in which children were not provided with the 
reward at the beginning of the task (No extra-reward condition) and (b) represents the 
condition in which children were provided with the reward (Extra-reward condition) 
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Figure 2. Percentage of 4- and 5-year-old children who allocated their preferred 
reward into their own box for “right now” and “tomorrow” in the Resource Allocation 
task. (a) represents the condition in which children were not provided with the reward at 
the beginning of the task (No extra-reward condition) and (b) represents the condition in 
which children were provided with the reward (Extra-reward condition) 
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